Conference Contribution Details
Mandatory Fields
Nick Tosh
Annual Conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science
Reviving finite frequentism: Humean chance without best systems
Cambridge
Conference Paper
Optional Fields
09-JUL-14
12-JUL-14
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Triennial fund
Publication Themes