Peer-Reviewed Journal Details
Mandatory Fields
Duddy, C,Piggins, A
2013
May
Mathematical Social Sciences
Collective Approval
Published
()
Optional Fields
65
190
194
We consider the problem of aggregating individual approval ballots into one collective approval ballot. An approval ballot is simply a subset of a given set of alternatives. An individual may approve of as many alternatives as he or she wishes. Each approval is counted as a vote. We show that if an aggregation rule is neutral, consistent and discerning, then an alternative is collectively approved of if it receives a number of votes greater than the mean number of votes received by the alternatives and is not approved of if it receives a number of votes less than the mean. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
DOI 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.12.004
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