Peer-Reviewed Journal Details
Mandatory Fields
Duddy, C;Piggins, A
2020
May
Journal Of Mathematical Economics
A foundation for Pareto optimality
Published
()
Optional Fields
SOCIAL CHOICE CORRESPONDENCES ARROW
88
25
30
Can an axiomatic justification be given for the requirement that society picks all and only Pareto optimal alternatives at each profile of individual preferences? Using the framework of fixed-agenda social choice theory, we present a characterization of the Pareto optimal social choice correspondence. We introduce a new independence condition, P-independence. When combined with three natural assumptions, P-independence leads to the conclusion that the social choice set and the Pareto optimal set are the same. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
0304-4068
10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.005
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