Peer-Reviewed Journal Details
Mandatory Fields
Duddy, C;Perote-Pena, J;Piggins, A
2010
March
Social Choice And Welfare
Manipulating an aggregation rule under ordinally fuzzy preferences
Published
WOS: 4 ()
Optional Fields
SOCIAL-WELFARE FUNCTIONS CHOICE TRANSITIVITY SETS
34
411
428
It is well known that many aggregation rules are manipulable through strategic behaviour. Typically, the aggregation rules considered in the literature are social choice correspondences. In this paper the aggregation rules of interest are social welfare functions (SWFs). We investigate the problem of constructing a SWF that is non-manipulable. In this context, individuals attempt to manipulate a social ordering as opposed to a social choice. Using techniques from an ordinal version of fuzzy set theory, we introduce a class of ordinally fuzzy binary relations of which exact binary relations are a special case. Operating within this family enables us to prove an impossibility theorem. This theorem states that all non-manipulable SWFs are dictatorial, provided that they are not constant. This theorem uses a weaker transitivity condition than the one in Perote-Pea and Piggins (J Math Econ 43:564-580, 2007), and the ordinal framework we employ is more general than the cardinal setting used there. We conclude by considering several ways of circumventing this impossibility theorem.
0176-1714
10.1007/s00355-009-0405-5
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