Peer-Reviewed Journal Details
Mandatory Fields
Perote-Pena, J;Piggins, A
2007
June
Journal Of Mathematical Economics
Strategy-proof fuzzy aggregation rules
Published
WOS: 13 ()
Optional Fields
SOCIAL-WELFARE FUNCTIONS STRICT PREFERENCE CHOICE FUNCTIONS PIVOTAL VOTERS TRANSITIVITY THEOREM SETS
43
564
580
We investigate the structure of fuzzy aggregation rules which, for every permissible profile of fuzzy individual preferences, specify a fuzzy social preference. We show that all fuzzy aggregation rules which are strategy-proof and satisfy a minimal range condition are dictatorial. In other words, there is an individual whose fuzzy preferences determine the entire fuzzy social ranking at every profile in the domain of the aggregation rule. To prove this theorem,. we show that all fuzzy aggregation rules which are strategy-proof and satisfy the minimal range condition must also satisfy counterparts of independence of irrelevant alternatives and the Pareto criterion. There has been hardly any treatment of the manipulability problem in the literature on social choice with fuzzy preferences. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
0304-4068
10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.09.010
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